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ADmIRALTY-SEAMEN'S WAGES--ADVANCES IN FOREIGN PORT BY FOREIGN
VESSEL.-The libelants were seamen who signed in France for two years' serv-
ice on a British ship, receiving an advance of a half-month's wages, which was
legal under British law. When the vessel reached New York, the seamen, being
afraid of submarines, abandoned their contract and, a demand for half their
wages having been refused, libeled the vessel, claiming full wages and contend-
ing that the advance payment made in France was void under the Seamen's Act
(U. S. Comp. St. 1916, secs. 8322-3). Held, that the libelants were not entitled to
recover, as they had already received more than half of their wages in advance
and such advances were legal payments. The Belgier (1917, S. D. N. Y.) 246
Fed. 966.
The federal statute has been held to forbid advances by foreign ships in
American ports and by American ships in foreign ports. Patterson v. Bark
Eudora (19o3) 19o U. S. i69, 23 Sup. Ct. 821; The Rhine (917, E. D. N. Y.)
244 Fed. 833. One case has held that it forbids advances to alien seamen by a
foreign ship in a foreign port. The Imberhorne (1917, S. D. Ala.) 24o Fed.
83o. It is believed that the principal case makes a more reasonable construc-
tion of the statute in excluding such a case from its application.
CONFLICT OF LAws-JuRISDcTIoN FOR DIVORCE-SuIT BETWEEN ALIENS IN
FRANCE.-An action for divorce was brought by a Russian woman against her
Russian husband in the French courts. In accordance with the requirements
of Russian law (one of the parties having been a Roman Catholic and the other
a member of the Orthodox Russian Church), they had been married in Paris by
a Russian clergyman; and they had also had a marriage ceremony performed
by a French civil officer. By the Russian law, a divorce between people whose
marriage was required to be celebrated before a Russian clergyman must like-
wise be pronounced by a Russian clergyman. Held, on a plea to the jurisdiction
of the French court, that the court had no jurisdiction, inasmuch as the parties
were governed by their national (Russian) law, which was their personal
statute. The court added that a treaty of 1874 between Russia and France
giving the citizens of either contracting party full access to the courts of the
other had no application to the case, and that the French civil courts could
neither enforce the provisions of the Russian law requiring Russian religious
authorities to pronounce a divorce, nor enforce the French law in substitution
for the Russian law. Stankiewicz v. Stankiewicz, Court of Paris, Jan. 26, 1914,
reported in (1917) 44 CLuNET, 602.
This decision may be contrasted with another, also involving the marriage
status of aliens. The marriage of two British subjects, celebrated in France,
was annulled by a British court. On application in France for an exequatur
validating and decreeing the registration of the British judgment, it was held
that the judgment should be enforced in France. Sassoon v. Sassoon, Tribunal
Civil de la Seine, December 13, 1916, reported in (1917) 44 CLUNET, 614.
CON riiT-DIREcr CoNTEm's-LTER MAILED TO JUDGE.-While an appeal
from a decree denying probate of a will was pending before the Prerogative
Court of New Jersey, the proponent of the will mailed a letter to the Ordinary
in which he abused opposing counsel and the trial judge, disparaged a witness
and protested that he would agree to donate whatever he might receive under
the will, if it were probated, to any charitable institution the Ordinary might
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select. Held, that the proponent was guilty of a direct contempt In re Merrill
(1917, N. J. Prerog.) io2 Ati. 4oo.
The case is interesting for the learned opinion of the Ordinary on the subject
of contempts and on the jurisdiction of the Prerogative Court to punish them.
CONTEMPT-DIREcT CONTEMPTS-REFUSAL BY DRAFT BOARD TO GIVE Up COURT
Room.-The respondent, chairman of a local draft board, was using the vice
chancellor's courtroom for the physical examination of men drafted for military
service, when he was informed that the vice chancellor wanted the room for the
hearing of a case. The respondent declined to give up the room that day, and,
although he had an hour's intermission at noon, failed to.communicate with the
vice chancellor. Held, that the respondent was guilty of contempt facie curiae.
In re Schmidt (917, N. J. Ch.) io2 Atl. 264.
The court was careful to point out that there was no conflict of authority
between, the state court of chancery and the federal exemption board. There
were other rooms in the court house which could have been used by the board.
In view of the respondent's protests of respect for the court, no punishment was
inflicted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DuE PRocESs-L EN UoN SALOON PREMIsEs UNDER
DRAmSHoP AcT.-The defendant owned a building which he rented to a tenant
for a saloon. In a prior suit the plaintiff had recovered a judgment by default
against the tenant for injury to her means of support by reason of intoxicating
liquor furnished to her husband at the tenant's saloon. The Dramshop Act
(Ill. Rev. Stat. ch. 43, sec. io) declared that such a judgment should be a lien
upon the premises wherein the liquor was sold if the owner had rented them
for the purpose of the sale of intoxicating liquor. The present suit was brought
to subject the defendant's building to the lien of the judgment obtained against
his tenant The defendant contended that the enforcement of this lien would
deprive him of property without due process, since the judgment had been
rendered without notice to him or opportunity to defend. Held, that the lien
was enforceable and the statute, thus applied, constitutional. Eiger v. Garrity
(1918) 38 Sup. Ct 298.
The court reasons that the statute in effect makes the tenant the lessor's agent,
and that through this agency, voluntarily assumed by renting for saloon purposes,
the landlord becomes a participant in the sales and responsible for their con-
sequences. This is the first time the federal Supreme Court has passed upon
the question. For decisions by state courts sustaining such statutes, see cases
cited'in Garrity v. Eiger (i916) 272 Ill. 127, III N. E. 735.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DuE PRocEss OF LAW-VALIDITY OF LEGIsLATION PRo-
HIBITING "TRADING STAmps."--A statute of Wisconsin forbade the issuing of
"trading stamps" in connection with the sale of goods, subject to the exception
that sellers might issue tickets redeemable only in cash for amounts stated on
the faces thereof. A number of "trading stamp" firms brought actions against
the appropriate state officer, asking the court to prevent the enforcement of the
statute on the ground that it deprived them of liberty and property without due
process of law. Held, that the statute was valid. Sperry & Hutchinson Co. v.
Weigle (I917, Wis.) 166 N. W. 54.
The opinion calls attention to the great conflict of authority upon the point
at issue, the tendency of the cases in the state courts until recently being to
hold similar laws invalid. The decision in favor of the law is put on the
sensible ground that the view of the legislature that "trading stamp" schemes
are injurious to legitimate business is at least a reasonable one and hence that
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the requirements of due process are satisfied. In this the court followed recent
cases in the United States Supreme Court which upheld prohibitory taxes
upon "trading stamps." Rast v. Van Deman. & Lewis Co. (1916) 240 U. S. 342,
36 Sup. Ct 370; Tanner v. Little (1916) 240 U. S. 369, 36 Sup. Ct. 379.
CONTRACTS-BOND TO SECURE MATERIAL-MEN--GROCER SUPPLYING CONTRACTOR
FOOD FOR LABORERs.-The defendant, as surety for a contractor, gave the bond
required by federal statute (Comp. St 1916, sec. 6923) to insure payment to
persons supplying "labor or materials in the prosecution of" government work.
The work was the dredging of a portion of the St. Mary's river so remote from
any settlement that the contractor was obliged to furnish his laborers board,
for which a deduction was made from their wages. The complainant sold pro-
visions to the contractor on credit. Held, that the complainant was entitled to
recover payment under the bond. McKenna, Pitney and McReynolds, JJ.
dissenting. Brogan v. National Surety Co. (1918) 38 Sup. Ct 250.
Previous decisions of the Supreme Court had given a liberal construction to
the statute and to bonds given thereunder but none had gone quite so far as
the present case. Dicta opposed to the decision may be found in the authorities
cited in the opinion of the Circuit Court of Appeals, which the present decision
reversed. See National Surety Co. v. United States (1916, C. C. A. 6th) 228
Fed. 577. But under the peculiar facts of the case, the contract being performed
"in a wilderness," it is believed that food might properly be deemed material
used in the construction of the work.
CRIMINAL LAW-BRIBERY IN NATIONAL ELEC-IONs-LABILTY UNDER FEDERAL
STATUTEs.-The defendants were indicted under section 19 of the federal
Criminal Code (35 U. S. St at L. 1092; Comp. St 1916, sec. 1o183) which
denounces a conspiracy "to injure, oppress, threaten or intimidate any citizen
in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured to him by the
constitution or laws of the United States." The indictments were based on
alleged conspiracies to bribe voters in a national election. Held, that the con-
spiracies described were not within the statute. United States v. Bathgate
(1918) 38 Sup. Ct 269.
This decision both follows and supplements United States v. Gradwell (1916)
243 U. S. 476, 37 Sup. Ct. 407, discussed in (1917) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 137,
in which it was held that similar conspiracies were not indictable under section
37 of the federal Criminal Code as conspiracies "to defraud the United States."
The same arguments from legislative history which determined the Gradwell
case, leading to the conclusion that Congress had intended to leave the regula-
tion of such elections to the states, were held to be applicable here.
EMINENT DOMAIN-POWER OF CONDEMNOR TO ABANDON PROCEEDINGS AFTER
AwAR.-The plaintiff water company, acting under statutory powers confer-
ring upon it the power to acquire land by eminent domain proceedings, instituted
proceedings before the county commissioners for the condemnation of the
defendant's property. After a hearing the commissioners filed their award
assessing the defendant's damages and ordering the company to make pay-
ment. Thereafter the company, which had never taken possession of the
premises, delivered to the defendant "a written notice of so-called abandon-
ment and surrender" of the proceedings and the property. The defendant
disregarded this notice and filed with the commissioners a petition asking them
to issue a warrant of distress against the company to compel payment of the
award. The company then filed a bill in equity asking that the defendant be
restrained from further proceedings. Held, that the company did not have the
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power to abandon the proceedings after the award of damages had been made
by the commissioners. York Shore Water Co. v. Card (1917, Me.) 1o2 Atl. 321.
The court in its opinion recognizes that its decision is not in accord with the
rule prevailing in the majority of jurisdictions, but rightly says that so much
depends upon the statutory system of each state that precedents in another
state are not necessarily of value. The decision is based upon the view that
under the Maine system "the award of -the county commissioners stood as a
judgment until and unless it was appealed from." The making of the award
therefore imposed a duty upon the company to pay the sum awarded, a duty
-which it had no power to destroy except by securing a reversal on appeal.
EVMENc E-DYING DEcLARATIONS-OPINION Ru.E.--At a trial for murder the
following statement was admitted, "0 Lord, what a pity for Frank McNeal to
shoot a poor boy like me for nothing." Held, that the statement was inad-
missible, as it was at most an exclamation of self pity. McNeal v. State (1917,
Miss.) 76 So. 625.
The leading text-writers are in conflict over the question whether dying
declarations containing expressions of opinion should be admitted. 4 Chamber-
layne, Evidence, sec. 2852; 2 Wigmore, Evidence, sec. 1447. The Mississippi
Supreme Court has held admissible such declarations as "killed me without any
cause" and "killed him without cause." House v. State (1897) 74 Miss. 777, 21
So. 657; Jackson v. State (igo8) 94 Miss. i07, 48 So. 3. The court declared
that it would not extend the doctrine of these cases. For a discussion of
another recent case on the subject, see (i9g8) 27 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 700.
INsURAMCE-AccDENT-DATH BY SuBmINE.-The defendant issued a policy
insuring the holder against injury caused "by external, violent, and accidental
means." Injuries "from fire-arms of any kind or from explosives" were
expressly excluded. The insured sailed for England in i915 on the Arabic, and
this vessel ias torpedoed and sunk by a German submarine. Later the body of
the insured was found, wearing a life preserver, the death having been caused
by drowning. Held, that the beneficiary could recover on the policy. Woods
v. Standard Acc. Ins. Co. (i918, Wis.) 166 N. W. 2o.
The sinking of the vessel was of course an intentional act, although, by reason
of the Act of State doctrine, neither the crew of the submarine nor the rulers
of Germany could be held liable for it in a municipal court. See COMMENTS,
supra, p. 812. Nevertheless, the death may properly be held to be due
to an accident of the sea as we have come to regard it. The court considers
the elxplosion of the torpedo as a remote cause of the death and hence holds the
exclusion clause of the policy not applicable. In construing a policy like this it
is proper to apply a much narrower rule of causation than would be applied in
the law relating to crimes or torts.
WILLS-REPUBLcATION BY CODIcIL-EFFECT ON LAPsED LEGACY.-The testatrix
bequeathed $io to her daughter. After the daughter's death a codicil was
executed modifying another bequest but making no reference to the lapsed
legacy. By statute lineal descendants of a legatee who predeceases the testator
take the bequest given to such legatee (Cal. Civ. Code, sec. i3io). Another
section of the Code (sec. i3o7) gives a pretermitted heir, unless his omission
appears by the will to have been intentional, a share in the estate such as he
would have taken in case of intestacy. The son of the deceased daughter
claimed as pretermitted heir of the testatrix. Held, that the son was entitled
to share in the estate as a pretermitted heir, because republication of the will
made void the legacy to the daughter then deceased, and section 13io applied.
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only to lapsed and not to void legacies. Shaw and Sloss, JJ., dissenting. In re
Matthews' Estate (1917, Cal.). i69 Pac. 233.
Under similar statutes the prevailing view allows the descendant of a legatee
dead when the will was made to take the bequest Lewis v. Corbin (I9O7) 195
Mass. 520, 8i N. E. 248; contra, Lindsay v. Pleasants (1846) .9 N. C. 320.
But even if one accepts the minority view as to the construction of such
statutes, it is difficult to support the court's application of the doctrine of
republication in the principal case. This doctrine should be applied to effectu-
ate not to defeat the testator's intentions. See Izard v. Hurst (i697, Ir. Ch.)
2 Freem. 223 (adeemed legacy not revived); Gurney v. Gurney (1855, Eng.
V. C.) 3 Drew. 208 (legacy to witness not rendered void); it re McCauley's
Estate (i9o3) 138 Cal. 432, 71 Pac. 512 (legacy to charity not made illegal).
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION AcT-WHo IS AN EMPLOY E-OFFICER OF COR-
PoRATIom.-The claimant received $50 per week for his services as secretary-
treasurer of respondent corporation as well as salesman and collector of its
accounts. He sustained an injury while acting in the latter capacity. He was
also one of the three stockholders of the corporation. Held, that the mere fact
that he was an officer and stockholder did not exclude him from the benefits
of the Workmen's Compensation Act In re Raynes (1917, Ind.) 118 N. E. 387.
On a somewhat similar state of facts the New York Court of Appeals held that
the majority stockholder and president of a corporation, whose salary was $70
per week, was not an employee within the meaning of the Workmen's Compen-
sation Act. Bowne v. S. W. Bowne & Co. (1917) 221 N. Y. 28, ii6 N. E. 364,
discussed in 27 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 284. The principal case approves but dis-
tinguishes this decision. The court declares that there is no single decisive test
Which can be applied to the problem as to what sort of employee is entitled to
compensation. The solution depends on a consideration of all the facts in each
particular case, regard being had to the purposes of the legislation.
